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The Weimar Republic and the War of Memory
Madeline Dixon
msdixon@smu.edu
Erin Hochman 1
ABSTRACT

World War I dismantled Imperial Germany and, long after the fighting had ceased, continued to shape the newly-born Weimar
Republic. This paper argues that a war over the memory of the Great War in Germany led to Weimar’s downfall. The Weimar
Republic’s lack of a collective memory of the first total war became the center of the political debate on the republic’s viability
and Germany’s future. This war debate was potently wielded in the arenas of literature and art to heighten political conflict and
ensure that the war’s memory seeped into every aspect of society. Ultimately, Weimar’s inability to promote any consensus on the
war’s meaning in the face of opposition from the conservative and extremist right weakened the republic significantly and led to
its downfall.

1.

INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the havoc World War I
unleashed on Germany and its impact on the Weimar
Republic. While the war dismantled Imperial Germany, a
second war soon began to brew within the newly-formed
republic. This war over the memory of the Great War was a
key player in Weimar’s destruction, and was rooted in
differing interpretations of the war’s meaning, which existed
as soon as the declarations of August 1914. The first of such
narratives was the “Spirit of 1914,” an exuberant celebration
of the war’s conception that took hold of Germans and drove
them and their celebrations into the streets. Roger
Chickering, Professor of History in the Center for German
and European Studies at Georgetown University, argues that
this “rhapsody on national unity offered no realistic formula
for solving the problems that beset Germany in 1914 [and]
…. was bound instead to raise expectations that the pressures
of industrial warfare were calculated to frustrate.” 2 As
colossal losses and the realization that this war would not be
quickly fought and won beset Germans, many realized that
the optimistic promises the “Spirit of 1914” offered would
come to naught. The almost immediate frustration of the
“Spirit of 1914” was a dark foreshadowing of the effects of
the Great War.
In this instance, we see a microcosm of the entire
German war experience. Unrealistic expectations of the First
World War were quickly thwarted and, in consequence, the
disillusionment about the war that abounded was shoved into
the hands of the Weimar Republic by Imperial Germany,
which ceded its power at the war’s close. 3 The responsibility
to create a collective memory about the lost war to give
meaning to the millions of soldiers’ deaths and huge
sacrifices on the part of the German population was laid at
Weimar’s feet, and the impossibility of achieving such a feat
subsequently ensured that overly optimistic and unrealistic

expectations of Weimar in post-war Germany would be
frustrated, just as the “Spirit of 1914” had been.
While the legacy of World War I consumed
national debate in all countries that it marred, its memory
was more manageable in the victorious Allied countries,
where colossal losses were, in a sense, justified by victory.
Its legacy in Weimar Germany, however, was heavily
contested. For Weimar, the war produced seemingly
insurmountable obstacles such as “the war guilt clause” of
the Treaty of Versailles, a new republic that rose from the
ashes of Imperial Germany, and the difficulty of confronting
the unprecedented loss of life in the face of Germany’s
defeat. Ultimately, such obstacles bred a dangerous debate,
as they destabilized the political system. Imperial Germany’s
defeat in a war it had vowed to win produced a bitterness and
shame that, combined with the shock of the revolution and
birth of the republic, ultimately divided society on the war’s
meaning. This divisiveness created a politically fragmented
Germany. The Weimar Republic’s lack of a collective
memory of the first total war became the center of the
political debate on the republic’s viability and Germany’s
future. It engendered conflicting narratives about the war’s
meaning that were adopted by all sides of the political
spectrum and were used to support or dismantle the republic.
The conservative and extremist right’s conception of the
Great War’s memory presented a conception of the war’s
loss that claimed Jews, communists, socialists, women, and
the supporters of the republic “stabbed the German army in
the back” and betrayed the monarchy through revolution.
This interpretation relied upon a scapegoating of anyone
who supposedly threatened the desired return to an older,
conservative order. This narrative was explicitly used to
attack leftist beliefs and support for the republic’s
progressive political changes, such as the abolishment of the
monarchy, women’s suffrage, and workers’ rights. I will
argue that Weimar’s inability to promote any consensus on
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the war’s meaning in the face of opposition from the
conservative and extremist right weakened the republic
significantly and made it most vulnerable to destruction.
Weimar’s lack of a national memory was, essentially, the
lack of any powerful rejection of rightist beliefs and myths
about the Great War, and with no strong opposition to this
narrative, it became a more accepted and appealing version
of the war story. The war debate, however, was not solely
limited to the political realm, and it was potently wielded in
the arenas of literature and art to heighten political conflict
and ensure that the war’s memory seeped into every aspect
of society.
Historians Detlev Peukert 4 and Eric D. Weitz 5
have identified the extreme right as one of the greatest
threats to the Weimar Republic, and historians Peter
Fritzsche, 6 Jerry Palmer, 7 and Benjamin Ziemann 8 all assess
how the memory of the Great War fragmented post-war
Germany. Recent exploration of Weimar’s history has been
pursued in an effort to both acknowledge Weimar’s
association with the development of the National Socialist
German Workers’ Party, and more largely refute this
association as the sole reason to study Weimar. As Detlev
Peukert stated, “Weimar is more than a beginning and an
end. The fourteen years of its existence constitute an era in
its own right.” 9 In The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of
Classical Modernity, Peukert introduces a study of Weimar
that challenges the previous domination of the Sonderweg
theory, which claimed that Germany was on a fixed special
path to Nazism and destruction. Peukert’s work argues that
the development of Nazism was not guaranteed, and
Weimar’s failure was due to a crisis of modernization that
presented a host of contradictions and complications that
destabilized the republic and made it vulnerable to the rise
of a dangerous fascism. 10 Peukert paved the way for
extensive research that recognized Weimar as its own
prominent period rather than a mere precursor to Nazism.
Eric D. Weitz, professor of History at City College
and the Graduate Center at City University of New York
refutes Peukert’s analysis of Weimar and instead asserts that
Weimar’s fall was not accredited to the perils of modernity,
but that it was “pushed over the precipice by a combination
of the established Right, hostile to the republic from its very
founding, and the newer extreme Right.” 11 Weitz
acknowledges the costly implications of human action in
Weimar’s downfall and eloquently explains how a
democratic republic can be dismantled from within, by those
who “espouse the language of democracy and use the

liberties afforded to them by democratic institutions to
undermine the substance of democracy.” 12
Peukert and Weitz’s broad histories of Weimar
provide invaluable information about Weimar’s formation
and trajectory towards destruction. Additionally, the works
of historians who look more closely into the realm of
memory within Weimar and its relation to the First World
War are integral to my argument. In Germans into Nazis,
Peter Fritzsche, professor of History at University of Illinois,
explores how and why the Nazi Party came to power in
Weimar Germany and eventually destroyed the republic. His
book revolves around four monumental periods, July 1914,
November 1918, January 1933, and May 1933, and
examines them in chronological order to determine how
Germany’s social and political changes coincided with the
Nazi Party’s climactic rise to power. 13 Fritzsche’s argument
departs from the traditional observation that Germany’s
defeat in 1918 was the catalyst of Nazism. He argues instead
that 1914 is the true point of departure for Nazism because
the “Spirit of 1914” anticipated the Nazi deviation from an
established political tradition to promote a popular ethnic
nationalism and simultaneously address social reforms that
Germans craved when faced with the instability of the
Weimar republic. 14 Fritzsche eloquently argues that the
outbreak of the First World War and the national mood that
accompanied it laid the foundation for the formation and
success of National Socialism.
Jerry Palmer’s Memories from the Frontline offers
a detailed analysis of how and why divergent understandings
and representations of the war and its purpose abounded in
the post-war societies of Great Britain, France, and
Germany. 15 Palmer focuses on literary works and memoirs
to explore how their writers “made sense of their experiences
through narrative, and what sense their contemporaries made
of these texts.” 16 Palmer argues that Germany faced a unique
challenge in its public and private attempts to remember the
war, because of its inability to establish an agreed upon
national commemoration for its soldiers in the face of defeat,
contentions about the 1918 surrender, and the republic’s
birth. 17 Palmer’s work explains how the contestations
Germany faced were apparent in the memoirs and literary
works of Weimar’s contemporaries, and emphasizes how the
literary realm became another battleground for political
domination.
Like Weitz and Peukert, Benjamin Ziemann
refutes the notion of the Sonderweg in Contested
Commemorations: Republican War Veterans and Weimar
Political Culture. He goes one step further though, and

Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of
Classical Modernity, Translated by Richard Deveson, New
York: Hill and Wang, 1989
5 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
6 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1998.
7 Jerry Palmer, Memories from the Frontline: Memoirs and
Meaning of The Great War from Britain, France and
Germany, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
8 Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations:
Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Ibid, xii.
Peukert, xiii-xiv.
11 Weitz, 5.
12 Ibid, 408.
13 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998.
14 Ibid, 7-9.
15 Jerry Palmer, Memories from the Frontline: Memoirs
and Meaning of The Great War from Britain, France and
Germany, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 5.
16 Palmer, 13.
17 Palmer, 203-204.
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argues that despite general opinion, republican war veterans
were significant players in Weimar’s debate about the
memory of the First World War and provided extensive
support for the republic. 18 Ziemann’s work acknowledges
the failure of groups such as the Reichsbund and
Reichsbanner to successfully combat the Right’s narrative
that allowed it to destroy the republic, but proves that despite
this failure, members of such groups “were at the forefront
of attempts to develop a pro-republican language of war
remembrance, and to elaborate an appropriate set of
commemorative symbols and rituals in the public sphere.” 19
Contested Commemorations proves that republican
supporters did exist and did fight against conservative and
extreme right conceptions of Weimar’s legitimacy and
viability.
My argument is unique because it will integrate
these assessments to identify conflict over the war’s memory
as the main reason for Weimar’s vulnerability to the right
and further the discussion surrounding Weimar’s
destruction. My exploration of the war memory’s influence
on Weimar’s viability is also a continuation of the one made
by Richard Bessel, Professor Emeritus of Twentieth Century
History at the University of York and a specialist in the
social and political history of modern Germany. In Germany
after the First World War, Bessel asserts that the social,
economic, and political issues of the Weimar Republic
stemmed from the “Spirit of 1914,” the First World War and
its aftermath, as well as other weakened economic social
structures. The consequence of such challenges was that
Weimar was never capable of transitioning to peacetime, and
instead remained a post-war society. 20 My argument differs
from the aforementioned scholars because I conclude that
Weimar’s debate over the memory of World War I was the
republic’s tipping point. The disunified debate over memory
weakened the republic and its supporters, was used by the
conservative and extreme right to destroy the republic from
within, and ultimately prohibited Weimar from transitioning
out of its post-war phase. Weimar’s war of memory was the
greatest contributing factor to the republic’s demise.
My argument is structured into three sections.
Section I is an exploration of the fragmentation of memory
and understanding of the Great War in Germany between
1914 and 1918. In this section, I will prove my argument
through an exploration of primary sources that emphasize
how Germans experienced and remembered the “Spirit of
1914,” and the differences in how German soldiers
understood their participation in the war while they fought
in it. Section II will look at the intersection of the war
memory and Weimar politics, and how conservatives and the
extremist right viewed and used the war’s memory to destroy

the Weimar Republic. Section III will explore the
intersection of the politics surrounding the war’s memory
and Weimar’s artistic realms of art and literature. I will then
conclude with an analysis of how and why the memory of
the war was so contested and why such contestation was so
dangerous to the Weimar Republic.

Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations:
Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 278-279.
19 Ziemann, 3.
20 Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 283-284.
21 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War,
1914-1918, 13.
22 See Figure 1.
23 “Enthusiasm and Sympathy for Austria on the Streets of
Berlin, August 1, 1914, in German History in Documents

and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2288.
24 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1925 in German History in
Documents and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=817.
25 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Kulturkrieg (Berlin 1915), 25-26, in
The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in
Germany by Jeffrey Verhey, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000, 5.
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2.

FRAGMENTATION OF MEMORY
DURING THE WAR

The announcement of Germany’s participation in
the war in the summer of 1914 sparked an enormous spirit
of unification within the country. Public festivals
accompanied press announcements of the imminent march
towards war. Armed with patriotic songs and the waving of
flags, men and women gathered in public squares, on street
corners, and around kiosks to celebrate in the exhilaration of
the diplomatic crisis. 21 A photo by an unknown
photographer dated August 1, 1914 shows a large gathering
of Berliners in a square surrounding a portrait of the Austrian
Emperor Franz Joseph I. 22 The men in the crowd lifted their
hats to the Emperor to exemplify their support for their
Austrian ally and their excitement about Germany’s
participation in the burgeoning conflict. 23 This sentiment is
mirrored in Mein Kampf. Adolf Hitler, the future leader of
the Nazi Party, remarked on the pervasive sense of joy that
overtook him upon the war’s declaration, “those hours
appeared like the redemption from the annoying moods of
my youth…. overwhelmed by impassionate enthusiasm, I
had fallen on my knees and thanked Heaven out of my
overflowing heart that it had granted me the good fortune of
being allowed to live in these times.” 24 Excitement for the
war was not limited to extreme nationalists. Ernst Troeltsch,
a liberal theologian and a member of the German
Democratic Party, observed that “under this incredible
pressure German life melted in that indescribable wonderful
unity of sacrifice, brotherhood, belief, and certainty of
victory which was, and is, the meaning of the unforgettable
August.” 25 August of 1914 would be remembered
throughout the war and the years of the Weimar Republic,
but its meaning was not unified.
What would later be referred to as the “Spirit of
1914” had overtaken the country, and this immediate sense
of national duty and consciousness would frame public
understanding and memory of the war’s meaning for years
to come. Kaiser Wilhelm II addressed this feeling of unity
when he spoke on the balcony of the royal palace on August
1, 1914, to celebrate the beginning of the war:
Should there be battle, all political parties will
cease to exist! I, too, have been attacked by one
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party or another. That was in times of peace. It is
now forgiven with all my heart. I no longer think
in terms of parties or confessions; today we are all
German brothers and only German brothers. If our
neighbors want it no other way, if our neighbors
do not grant us peace, then I hope to God that our
good German sword will emerge victorious from
this hard battle.” 26
The Kaiser emphasized the feeling of unity that permeated
Germany, and particularly how in this time of crisis, German
identity overshadowed all other religious, social, or political
affiliations that had caused discussion within German
society. The Kaiser also instilled, though subtly, another
prominent German interpretation of the war in his reference
to Germany’s neighbors and their treatment of the German
nation. He placed the burden of ending the war on every
nation except Germany, insinuating that Germany’s
declaration of war was an act of self-defense and nonaggression. This declaration categorized Germany as the
non-guilty party, which the German population internalized
so fully that it believed Germany had no responsibility for
the consequences of the conflict. This perception of the war
would permeate German opinions even after its end in 1918,
and would influence the post-war international environment,
particularly with the Treaty of Versailles. While the Kaiser’s
emphasis on a national unity was a product of the
governmental tactic to spark support for the war effort, it
also reflected an experience that many Germans shared in
the summer of 1914.
While the “Spirit of 1914” was prevalent in the
hearts of many, and became a beacon of hope that many
clung to, its popularity should not suggest that Imperial
Germany was united. In Imperial Germany and the Great
War: 1914-1918, Roger Chickering emphasizes the
political, social, and cultural disunity that Germany suffered
when the war broke out. He remarked that the premise of the
“Spirit of 1914” “was the involvement of all Germans in a
great national exertion. It implied as well, however, an
equitable sharing of both the burdens and rewards of this
endeavor. Once these expectations were shown to be empty,
the ‘Spirit of 1914’ took on the aura of an elusive fantasy, a
painful reminder of the idealism that had reigned in the first
hour.” 27 As Germany became acquainted with the horrors of
modern combat, and the painful burden that participation in
total war required, the momentary euphorically-charged
emotions of the summer soon faded away. In his novel, Class
of 1902, Ernst Glaeser reflects on the situation at the home
front, specifically, the hunger he experienced as a boy. At a
farm where he stayed, gendarmes checked the quantities of
grain that were threshed, and “confiscated all the harvest.
The farmers hated them as much as they had hated the
French in 1914; even more, for they weren’t able to shoot
them. The word ‘enemy’ now meant gendarmes.” 28 Ernst

noted that by 1917, “we hardly mentioned the war, all our
talk was of lack of food.” 29 The ephemeral unification of all
Germans for a common cause and hope dissipated as
domestic suffering developed.
The hopes of 1914 were replaced by a
disillusionment that was heightened by the fragmentation of
experience, and disagreement over meaning the war
presented. In 1924, Kurt Tucholsky, a German-Jewish
journalist and satirist, meditated on the aftermath of the
“Spirit of 1914:”
The wave of drunkenness which overtook the
country ten years ago has left behind many hungover people who know no other cure for their
hangover than to become drunk again. They have
learned nothing. Today the spiritual foundation on
which Germany rests is no different from that
when it was founded. No spiritual experience has
touched the country, for the war was none. It
changed bodies into cadavers, but it left the spirit
completely untouched. 30
Ten years after the outbreak of the First World War,
Tucholsky criticized the continued existence of a misguided
German populace that continued to invoke the “Spirit of
1914” as a holy ideal without truly understanding its costly
implications. For Tucholsky, the spirit existed as nothing
short of unrealized desires. Later, the hope that the birth of
the republic instilled within Germany’s populace would take
on the same bitter sting that the “Spirit of 1914” held, as it
too could only frustrate lofty and idealized expectations.
The unification that the “Spirit of 1914” seemed to
offer shattered and fragmented as men marched to battle.
This fragmentation is apparent in how frontline soldiers
experienced the war, and how they perceived these
experiences. The war letters of German students who
volunteered to fight highlight these variances in memory.
Jerry Palmer, former Professor of Communications at
London Metropolitan University U.K., argues that in letters
“we find divergent ways of understanding and representing
the war…. we [also] see different understandings of the
purpose and overall meaning of war, independent of
individual experiences of it.” 31 Such divergences, are,
therefore, multifaceted, as they encompass both the
individual and collective realms of memory, which were
politically strained at the war’s end.
Letters written by soldiers during their time at the
front or in battle attest to the nuances of individual
experience and general attitudes towards the war. No one
nation possessed a homogenous army of physically and
mentally flawless male warriors who glorified the justice of
war. This reality was difficult for Germany to accept, as the
Imperial government promoted traditional, romanticized
depictions of its soldiers. The dichotomy between soldiers’
interpretations of the war emphasizes this reality. Twenty-

26 “The Kaiser Speaks from the Balcony of the Royal
Palace (August 1, 1914),” German History in Documents
and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=815.”
27 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War,
17.
28 Ernst Glaeser, Class of 1902, Columbia: The University
of South Carolina Press, 2008, 289.

Ibid.
Kurt Tucholsky, “The Spirit of 1914” published in Die
Weltbühne, August 7, 1924, in The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, 20.
31 Jerry Palmer, Memories from the Frontline: Memoirs
and Meaning of the Great War from Britain, France and
Germany, London: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2018, 5.
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three-year-old Franz Blumenfeld, a student of Law at
Freiburg, wrote to his mother while on the train to the front
on September 24th, 1914. He attempts to explain to her why
he volunteered for the war:
[I]t was not from any enthusiasm for war in
general, nor because I thought it would be a fine
thing to kill a great many people or otherwise
distinguish myself. On the contrary, I think that
war is a very, very evil thing, and I believe that
even in this case it might have been averted by a
more skillful diplomacy. But, now that it has been
declared, I think it is a matter of course that one
should feel oneself so much a member of the
nation that one must unite one’s fate as closely as
possible with that of the whole…. For what counts
is always the readiness to make a sacrifice, not the
object for which the sacrifice is made. 32
In his explanation, Franz expresses the duality of his own
personal interpretation of the war. First, his moral
convictions classify the war as monstrous and wrong. Yet,
the intensity of his duty to the Fatherland challenges his own
internal morality. Although disgusted by the prospects of
fighting in a war he vehemently opposed, his national duty
to participate and fight for Germany overshadowed his
personal and moral convictions. Franz’s sense of national
responsibility yet simultaneous hatred of the callous,
inhumane war presents a fragmented interpretation of his
experience in the conflict. This conflict within Franz shows
how opposing interpretations of the war were not limited to
any specific realm. Soldiers like Franz could oppose the war
internally and still participate in it. The war, then, had no
common, agreed upon meaning in any realm.
One month later Franz was in Northern France,
and on October 14th, 1914, he wrote in fear of the war’s
negative influence on his personhood and faith in humanity.
He was largely unmoved by the brutal realities he had to
endure such as the harsh environmental factors of dirt,
grime, and mud, and the constant presence of dead and
wounded men. He writes:
the pain of all that is not nearly so keen or lasting
as one imagined it would be. Of course that is
partly due to the fact that one knows one can’t do
anything to prevent it. But may it not at the same
time be a beginning of a deplorable callousness,
almost barbarity, or how is it possible that it gives
me more pain to bear my own loneliness than to
witness the sufferings of so many others? Can you
understand what I mean? What is the good of
escaping all the bullets and shells, if my soul is
injured? 33
Franz was faced with the task of justifying his participation
in a cataclysmic event that was required of him by their
homeland, but would chip away at his most human virtues.
This was the price that many young German volunteers paid.

Distressed at the rapid rate of his adjustment to the external
horrors of the Great War, Franz questions the point of
returning from an event that was destroying the best parts of
himself. For Franz, war stripped men of their humanity and
virtues, instead of enlightening them. Yet, not all men agreed
with this interpretation of war’s consequences.
Blumenfeld’s sentiment, therefore, contrasts with
another German soldier’s perception of the war. Hero
Hellwhich was a twenty-year-old German infantryman who
appreciated war for the virtues it produced. In a letter to his
parents, Hero stated, “It is not true that war hardens people’s
hearts. Anybody who comes back hardened, must have been
hard to start with. The effect of war is much more that of
purifying and deepening. One thanks God every day that one
is allowed to go on living.” 34 Hero’s conception of war
clashes with Franz’s. While they both appreciate the
necessity of their participation for the sake of the Fatherland,
Hero romantically and perhaps naïvely praises war for its
ability to ‘cleanse’ its participants. Hero’s view of war
aligned with the traditional conservative praise of fighting
and violence. Hero’s glorification of the Great War would
be used during and after 1918 to justify Germany’s
participation in a failed war and to dominate Weimar’s
debate on memory.
As the war raged on and domestic hardships
continued to mount, political consensus on the war’s
meaning splintered. In the August days, the “Spirit of 1914”
promised a victory and a coalescence of German citizens that
made the war difficult to oppose. The fervor of the nation
was palpable, and difficult to challenge. As Chickering
noted, the war’s lack of collective meaning extended to
opposition of the conflict, and dissent “was plagued…by its
own conceptual ambiguities.” 35 Thus, conflicting opinions
of opposition to the war rested on differing conceptions of
the conflict, which challenged any immediate form of largescale resistance in 1914. Resistance formed in the later years
of the war around “‘bread-and-butter’ grievances, such as
prices, shortages of food and fuel, working conditions, and
censorship.” 36 Domestic suffering came to the forefront of
the political conversation about the war, but it needed to
align with established organizations before it could hope to
wield any significant opposition.
In May 1916, labor demonstrators protested in
Berlin and demanded bread, freedom and peace. One
demonstrator, Karl Liebknecht, climbed an elevated surface
and yelled, “Down with the war! Down with the
government!” and was promptly arrested and later
imprisoned. 37 Liebknecht was quickly identified as a
martyr, and the political implications of his protest aligned
industrial strikes with war protests from 1916 to 1918. Cries
against the war and for an immediate peace were soon
accompanied by demands for domestic democratic reform.
The result was the unification of the Catholic Party, the
Progressives, and the Majority Social Democratic Party,

32 Franz Blumenfeld, letter to his mother, 24 September
1914, in German Students’ War Letters, edited by Philipp
Witkop, translated by A. F. Wedd, Philadelphia: First Pine
Street Books, 2002, 19-20.
33 Franz Blumenfeld, letter, 14 October 1914 (in Northern
France), in German Students’ War Letters, 20-21.

34 Hero Hellwhich, undated letter, in Letters from the Front,
selected and edited by John Laffin, London: J. M. Dent &
Sons Ltd London, 1973, page 69.
35 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War,
1914-1918, 151.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, 156.
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which together possessed a majority in the Reichstag and on
July 19, 1917 passed the “Peace Resolution.” The “Peace
Resolution” sought peace and reconciliation, and denounced
annexations of land and general social oppression. 38 Most
importantly, “it signaled a major rift in the domestic
consensus that had born the war, and it threatened a
constitutional crisis should the majority on the left refuse to
vote additional war credits.” 39 The Reichstag’s “Peace
Resolution” officially presented a meaning of the war that
rivaled the mythical “Spirit of 1914” interpretation.
General Erich Ludendorff, Supreme Commander
of the German Army, lashed out against the Reichstag’s
formal declaration of support for peace, which threatened his
own desires of a military victory. In response, German
troops and the home front were subjected to programs of
patriotism to “reinvigorate the vocabulary of patriotism as
the governing interpretive medium of the war.” 40 One facet
of this educational sanction was Ludendorff’s formation of
the “German Fatherland Party” in September 1917. 41 The
purpose of the Fatherland Party was to provide an
organization that acted as a tangible representation of
patriotic desires for victory, and to critique the Reichstag’s
“Peace Resolution.” Germany had entered into a war of
ideals that would evolve and take new shapes with Weimar’s
birth in 1918.

3.

THE DEBATE AROUND MEMORY:
POLITICS

In 1914, widespread German belief that Germany
would win World War I quickly and without heavy losses
guaranteed that the legacy of defeat would be difficult, if not
impossible for many Germans to bear and would
immediately spark a debate within Weimar. The German
army steadily collapsed between August and September of
1918, and between 750,000 and 100,000 soldiers attempted
to evade further service through feigned illness or surrender.
These developments ensured that by October, the German
army was in full retreat. 42 Despite such developments, the
public continued to believe that Germany could achieve
victory. Thus, Ludendorff’s announcement on September
29th that the war had been lost and the government’s next
step was to negotiate an armistice shocked both the civilian
population and the soldiers still in battle. 43 German
politicians were forced to cope with defeat by any means
possible.
One facet of the discussion about Germany’s loss
was rooted in beliefs surrounding the military’s viability in
the war’s final days. A Reichstag Subcommittee was formed
to investigate the collapse of the military in 1918. Albrecht
Philipp of the conservative German National People’s Party
or DNVP, served as the German National chair of the
subcommittee, and he directly addressed what he claimed
was the “sabotage” of the war effort, which included
Ibid, 164.
Ibid.
40 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War,
1914-1918, 165.
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42 Ibid, 186-187.
43 Ibid, 187.
38
39

https://scholar.smu.edu/jour/vol6/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jour.6.2.3

shirking, desertion to the enemy, mutiny, and strikes. Philipp
stated that shirking was “felt both at home and in the field.
At home it took the shape of applications for exemption. It
is of course difficult to give exact figures here. During the
war the public frequently complained of the numbers of
exemptions demanded by the Jews…. there is no doubt that
this fact influenced the mentality of those at the front.” 44
Philipp’s scapegoating of German Jews ignores the shirking
of military duty by non-Jewish Germans, which would have
outweighed that of Jews. In blaming Jews specifically,
Philipp also contributed to the development of the “Stab-inthe-Back Myth” adopted by the right, which blamed Jews for
the war loss. Philipp’s statements suggest that as a
conservative, he too held popular nationalistic beliefs that
Jews shirked their duties and thus catalyzed Germany’s loss.
The anti-Semitic narrative that Philipp promotes is a direct
response to the German military’s loss of the war at the
hands of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. As a conservative
who supported Imperial Germany’s war aims, Philipp’s
claims of subversion and sabotage of the military reflect a
blatant attempt to promote anti-Semitism and deflect the
burden of failure from the German Supreme Command so it
could retain a semblance of authority.
Accompanying the question of sabotage in the
post-war political debate was the question of whether
Germany could have realistically continued to fight in
November of 1918, a large area of contestation that further
fragmented collective memory and meaning of the war.
Retired general and conservative, Hermann von Kuhl,
worked with the Reichstag subcommittee to investigate the
German military’s collapse. To the question of whether the
German Army could have continued the fight in November,
Kuhl answered yes. He acknowledged the general impacts
of the exhaustion of the army in numbers and morale, but
ultimately credited the downfall of the army to “pacifist,
international, anti-militaristic endeavors and the
revolutionary undermining of the Army conducted from the
interior of the country.” 45 He explicitly named the
Independent Social Democrats as perpetrators of such
agitations. Kuhl’s testimony is a defense of the commanders
of the German army and an attempt to discredit the
participants of the revolution, which reflects his conservative
background and high-ranking military service. While Kuhl
addressed the limitations of an army that had been fighting
for four years, he placed the blame for Germany’s loss at the
hands of the revolution. This undermined the stability of the
Weimar Republic by claiming that its birth was the catalyst
of Germany’s defeat in World War I. This was a criticism
that conservatives and the radical right would continue to
promote to attack the republic.
Claims that Germany could continue the fight
through 1918 were contrasted with assessments that
Germany was at its breaking point. Simon Katzenstein, a
Reichstag deputy and Majority Social Democratic publicist,
44 “Dr. Philipp on Sabotage of the War Effort” in The Stabin-the-Back Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A
History in Documents and Visual Sources edited by George
S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, New York: Bloomsbury, 68.
45 “Could we have kept on Fighting in the Autumn?” in The
Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, edited by George S. Vascik and
Mark R. Sadler, 72.
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gave a deposition that challenged the statements given by
Albrecht Philipp. Katzenstein argued that revolutionary
ideas gained success because of the general tension and
exhaustion participation in the war fostered. 46 He agreed that
shirking and desertion were explicitly connected with such
exhaustion, but refuted Philipp’s sole blame of Jews and
revolutionaries stating:
It would require an intensive investigation that
goes beyond superficial anecdotal evidence to
determine how much shirking went on as the result
of personal relationship and bribery. This is
particularly true in the case of the superficial
rumors that Jews shirked service more than other
groups. The same could be said of similar
accusations against civil servants, landowners,
and some members of the officer corps. 47
Katzenstein criticized the conservative and nationalist
narrative that Philipp promoted for its explicit blame of a
vulnerable minority group, as well as for its inability to
address Imperial Germany’s failure. This criticism reflects
Katzenstein’s support for the republic and is an explicit
challenge of the use of shirking to discredit the republic’s
supporters.
Like Katzenstein, Herbert Corey, a correspondent
for The Washington Evening Star, recognized the critical
military situation, and refuted the nationalist attempt to
paper it over with fanciful claims of victory. In 1919, Corey,
accompanied by other correspondents, observed the German
Army in its retreat, and noted how “now and then an under
officer repeated the one tenet of that dangerous cult which is
gaining ground in Germany…which is ‘the German armies
have never been defeated.’ I do not doubt that this was
dictated from the general staff…. But the very men who
repeated it knew that it was essentially false…. ‘We were
finished.’ they said. ‘Kaput. We could do no more.’” 48 Here,
Corey observed a momentous development in the German
post-war order. Paradoxically, some defeated and
demobilizing soldiers uttered the lie that the German Army
had not been defeated in the field, while their comrades
simultaneously admitted that such claims were preposterous.
Interpretations of defeat conflicted even within the ranks of
men who had experienced it. Nationalist claims of victory
spread like a whisper through demobilized troops, slowly
gaining traction to the point where myth became more
desirable than truth. This cult that nationalist circles began
to construct as early as 1919 would develop into a potent
narrative that attacked the revolution, the Weimar Republic,
and any alternative or realistic memory of the war.
Nationalist circles used their cult of memory that
proclaimed a German victory to attempt to dismantle the
Weimar Republic before it had fully been established. One
tactic that conservatives adopted to bolster their cult of

memory was to blame the revolution for Germany’s defeat.
Conservative Albrecht Philipp again inserted himself into
the narrative, and claimed, “The revolution deprived us of
the last remains of our power of resistance and delivered us
defenseless into the hands of the enemy at the very moment
when Herr Scheidemann was announcing from the steps of
the Reichstag that the German people had been victorious all
along the line.” 49 Philipp expressed the popular nationalist
sentiment that the revolution corrupted and undermined the
morale of the military, and effectively stabbed the German
army and government in the back, ensuring defeat. Philipp’s
assertion that revolutionaries intervened at the very moment
that Germany could have been victorious was an ingenious
rhetorical tactic that simultaneously strengthened the
nationalist narrative and muddled the reality the German
army faced in 1918. Although Germany was teetering on the
edge of a brutal defeat, the revolution and the dismantlement
of the monarchy presented an opportunity to deny
Germany’s defeat and possibly restore the nation to its
former conservative, monarchical glory. An internal lack of
consensus on Germany’s military situation and experience
during and immediately after the war ensured that there
would be no agreement on an overall analysis of the war’s
meaning for many years. And, if there had been any chance
of such consensus, it was quickly destroyed by international
developments with the Allies.
As the Weimar Republic began to rise unsteadily
to its feet, the great powers negotiated a peace that would
establish a new European order. Domestic dissent was
exacerbated by what was perceived as ill-treatment of a
tattered, war-torn Germany by the victors. Germany’s
representatives came to the table with hopes that Wilson’s
Fourteen Points would dominate discussion and that a
revival of a strong Germany was a goal that coincided with
America’s wishes. 50 Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which
championed unselfish peace terms, alluded to the possibility
of lenient negotiations, that would ensure the creation of a
new world order that was compatible with democracy. 51
Unfortunately, the German representatives possessed
severely misguided expectations of the allied powers. Public
opinion of Germany in France and Great Britain was not
cordial in the least. Great Britain’s Prime Minister, David
Lloyd George, based his 1918 reelection campaign on the
slogan, ‘Hang the Kaiser!’ and promoted a trial of the Kaiser,
blaming him for the war. 52 At Versailles, the German
delegation walked blindly into a Charybdis. The Times
reported that the German foreign minister Count Ulrich von
Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived with a delegation of eight
others, and “their behaviour on their arrival is the talk of
Paris. They seem to have expected to have perfect liberty of
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movement during their stay at Versailles.” 53 When stopped
by a policeman for leaving the bounds of a park, Baron von
Lersner and Herr Warburg “indignantly protested that Allied
officers in Germany were allowed to go about anywhere in
uniform,” 54 clearly misunderstanding the power dynamics
between their nations. Additionally, many of the delegates
“brought golf clubs with them, which suggests that they
expect not only to have plenty of freedom but also plenty of
time to spend at Versailles.” 55 These strange occurrences
emphasize the awkwardness that surrounded the peace talks,
and the German assumption that they were, in a sense, on
equal footing with the Allies. Unfortunately, Germany had
sent men of a pre-World War I political world to negotiate
with nations that were irrevocably changed by the war. As
Weitz noted, when “Brockdorff-Rantzau [sported] a
monocle and a haughty manner, he aroused the Allies’ worst
images of aristocratic, militaristic Germany.” 56 Golf clubs
and monocles signify that the German delegates viewed the
peace talks with levity and an assumption of equality that
would only deepen the blow of the peace terms and catalyze
catastrophic consequences within Weimar.
The announcement of the peace terms shocked the
German delegation. As the German press obtained and
published the details of the treaty, a feeling of disbelief
shook the nation. The terms imparted what many Germans
perceived as significant losses. As Peukert noted, when
studying the significance of the Treaty of Versailles it is
important to distinguish “between the psychological burdens
which Versailles imposed and the real effects of the peace
treaty.” 57 Germany lost the territories of Alsace-Lorraine,
large parts of Posen and West Prussia, the Memel region, and
control over Upper Silesia and the Saar, as well as all its
colonies. 58 Although, such losses appear vast, they were
essentially valueless. 59 The reduction of the military, navy,
and air force followed. Germany could not mobilize under
any circumstances, and in Part V of the treaty, the Allies
dictated that the “army must not comprise more than seven
divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry” 60 with
no more than “6 battleships…6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers,
[and] 12 torpedo boats.” 61 Loss of territory and military
prowess was insurance for the Allies, a control mechanism
that ensured Germany would not attempt to remobilize its
forces and continue the war. One consequence of Part V of
the treaty for Weimar was the new government’s need for a
police force. The Social Democratic government was forced
to rely instead on the Freikorps for armed protection and
enforcement of laws, paramilitary bands that identified with
the extreme right, and were ideologically opposed to the
values of the republic. 62
Germany’s forced reduction of her forces was
fodder for German nationalists and the press, but even more

humiliating was Part VIII of the treaty, which detailed the
reparations clauses. The domestic debate over the
reparations clauses and Article 231 would slowly tear
Weimar apart in the coming years. Many considered the
treaty to be a diktat that was forcefully imposed by the Allies
without any consent from Germany, and referred to it as
such. The reparations clauses sparked a new hostility in
Weimar’s conversations about the war’s memory. The treaty
declared, “Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany
and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which
the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed
upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.” 63
The “war-guilt clause” was, in the eyes of Great Britain, the
United States, and France, a justification for their demand
for reparations. Peukert claimed that this clause was a direct
product of the influence of the “Spirit of 1914.” 64 It is
notable that the “Spirit of 1914” produced a general belief
that losses caused by the war would be rectified by massive
victory and this belief extended to all participating nations.
The harsh realities of four years of mobilization induced the
Allies to demand ‘the spoils of triumph’ 65 and once this was
combined with a violent public sentiment towards Germany,
and cries for ‘Hang the Kaiser!’, Germany’s guilt, at least in
the eyes of the victors, was solidified.
The republican government and Constitutional
Convention signed the treaty, but as a result, all of Weimar’s
first government resigned. 66 Even the first chancellor under
the Constitutional Convention and member of the Social
Democratic Party, Philipp Scheidemann, protested the
treaty. He “cried out that all Germans, from whatever group
(Stamm) or state (Land), stood together: ‘We are of one flesh
and one blood, and whoever tries to separate us cuts with a
murderous knife into the living body of the German
people.’” 67 Despite such nationalistic rhetoric, Germany
ultimately had no choice but to sign or endure a resumption
of the war and an Allied invasion. The Weimar Republic was
months old and had to assume international responsibility for
Imperial Germany’s war, which would taint the republic
irrevocably in the eyes of the Allied victors and its own
citizens. While the government ultimately signed the treaty
and its supporters stood by this decision, conservatives and
members of the extreme right would never accept the
humiliation of the Diktat. Instead, they would use it as
political ammunition against the republic in the coming
debate over the Great War’s memory.
Domestic German reactions to the peace terms
were hostile and catalyzed a violent national discussion
about the war and its meaning. Anger over the terms of the
treaty and the negative international perception of Germany
they promoted resulted in a momentary unification of
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republican supporters and the most conservative of the
German Reichstag. Unfortunately, while many liberals,
including the chancellor, Scheidemann, could denounce the
Treaty of Versailles alongside the right, unification of
conservative and leftist outrage was ephemeral. 68 After the
treaty had been signed and the government was re-instated
under President Friedrich Ebert, member of the liberal Social
Democratic party, supporters of the Weimar Republic who
continued to critique the treaty subtly undermined its
legitimacy. Anger moved to an alternative, often rhetorical
realm. Philosopher, theologian, and defender of the republic
Ernst Troeltsch remained stalwart in his opposition to
Germany’s acceptance of responsibility. 69 Troeltsch was a
member of the German Democratic Party, which had joined
the KPD, SPD, and Catholic Center Party to form the
Weimar Coalition and demand democracy in 1917. In “The
Dogma of Guilt,” Troeltsch analyzed the roots of the guilt
clause and provided an explanation for its existence.
Troeltsch asserted:
This peace, while presenting itself as a court of
inquisition, is also an imperialist monstrosity
made possible by the deceit of the Fourteen Points
and by Germany’s voluntary disarmament. It is
reminiscent of the way Rome once proceeded
against Carthage. The German counterproposals
to this peace acknowledged the legitimate
demands for reconstruction assistance for severely
damaged France and Belgium…. Instead, the
response to them was: the heretic is to be burned. 70
Troeltsch’s perception of Germany’s international plight
was a common opinion throughout Germany. His diction
bears notable historical and political allusions that are meant
to incite outrage at the Allied treatment of Germany. He
casts Great Britain, France, and the United States as
inquisitors in a court whose final assessment of logical
German counterproposals is to ‘burn the heretic.’ In
Troeltsch’s analysis, Germany’s only responsibility in the
situation is its folly for voluntarily disarming. This analysis
by a supporter of the republic was problematic because it
promoted hatred of the treaty and contributed to the right’s
narrative. Troeltsch implies that history will repeat itself, and
as Rome once ostracized and then razed Carthage, so too will
the victors decimate Germany. This popular, bitter domestic
response treated the peace as a Diktat, and was used by the
conservatives and extremist right to destroy the Weimar
Republic by attacking its credibility.
While hatred for the Treaty of Versailles was often
used by the right, the Stab-in-the-Back Myth was the
primary tool of the nationalist and conservative war narrative
to undermine the legitimacy of the republic. The Stab-in-theBack Myth, or Dolchstoßlegende in German, quickly gained
traction at the end of the First World War as an explanation
for why Germany was defeated in November of 1918, and

who was to blame for its defeat. In The Stab-in-the-BackMyth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, historians George
S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler argue that Germany’s defeat
in the fall of 1918 was psychologically devastating, and this
shock necessitated an explanation. Alternative conceptions
of Germany’s fate and lived experiences resulted in differing
narratives, but at the heart of many was the feeling of
betrayal. One extreme interpretation claimed that Imperial
Germany, the army, and the navy, had all been stabbed in the
back by domestic agitators, while another extreme asserted
that the proletarian revolution was betrayed by Friedrich
Ebert and the Majority Social Democrats, and the revolution
had not accomplished enough. 71 Conflicting narratives of
betrayal would compete for dominance in Weimar’s political
quagmire, and although the Dolchstoß housed multiple
interpretations, the nationalist narrative became most
prevalent and popular.
Nationalist supporters of the Stab-in-the-BackMyth ironically credited its birth to an English general,
rather than any one of their own parties. Major General Sir
Frederick Barton Maurice, a career military officer, served
as Director of Military Operations of the Imperial General
Staff in London in 1914 and, according to his German
nationalist supporters, possessed knowledge of the military
abilities of the German army. 72 Maurice was, therefore,
considered to be a credible outside source who could
accurately comment upon Germany’s undefeated status in
the Great War. The trouble began with a simple publication
in the Deutsche Tageszeitung, a conservative democratic
paper, on December 18, 1918, that claimed General Maurice
had written in the Daily News, “The civilian population
stabbed the Germany army to death from behind. The
behavior of the sailors of the German fleet was disreputable.
They chose to surrender their ships to the enemy, rather than
to defy death. They were the ones who saved Paris.” 73 The
correspondent writing this piece blatantly misinterpreted his
source, a report on General Maurice’s articles in the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung, that confusingly made it unclear whether
“Maurice believed that the civilian population stabbed the
army in the back or that it was a ‘common view’ within the
British populace and not necessarily shared by Maurice.” 74
Despite the truth or untruth behind his words, the sentiment
had become an imperative tenet of the Stab-in-the-BackMyth. The notice gave the myth credibility by placing it in
the mouth of General Maurice, and, more importantly,
granted nationalists a scapegoat for the failure of their
“invincible” German Army. The Dolchstoßlegende only
needed a reputable German spokesperson to commend it,
which it found in the figure of Paul von Hindenburg.
Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg and General
Erich Ludendorff served as the two leaders of Germany’s
Supreme Military Command from 1916 until the end of the
First World War. At the end of September 1918, Ludendorff

Weitz, Weimar Germany, 36.
The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton
Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994, 6.
70 Ernst Troeltsch, “The Dogma of Guilt” June 19, 1919 in
The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 12.
71 George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, The Stab-in-theBack-Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A History

in Documents and Visual Sources, New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2016, 1.
72 Vascik and Sadler, The Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, 94.
73 “Deutsche Tageszeitung Notice: ‘The Stabbed-in-theBack German Army,’ December 18, 1918,” in The Stab-inthe-Back-Myth edited by Vascik and Sadler, 95.
74 George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, The Stab-in-theBack-Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, 98.

68
69

Published by SMU Scholar, 2021

9

SMU Journal of Undergraduate Research, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

was aware of Germany’s military incapacities and inability
to continue the war, and he planned to place responsibility
for Germany’s defeat on the shoulders of a democratic,
civilian government to absolve Imperial Germany and the
military of blame for the disastrous conflict. 75
Unfortunately, Ludendorff was successful, and the Stab-inthe-Back Myth established itself as another chapter in his
narrative. In 1919, the Allies insisted that the German
government identify leaders of the imperial military and
government and try them for war crimes; consequently, the
Weimar National Assembly established a committee to
investigate war guilt and crimes. 76 Public interrogations
followed, and it was here where the Weimar Republic
allowed the Dolchstoßlegende to gain traction through
testimonies. Hindenburg testified in November of 1919, and
stated, “We were constantly concerned whether we would
maintain the support of the Home Front until the war could
be successfully concluded. At this time the intentional
undermining of the army and navy began…. The collapse
was inevitable. The revolution was only the capstone. An
English General rightly said, ‘The German army was
stabbed in the back.’” 77 In this testimony, Hindenburg
accomplished what Ludendorff began, and ultimately
solidified the nationalist narrative’s preferred rhetorical
attack of the Weimar Republic.
After Hindenburg’s testimony to the Reichstag the
debate around Germany’s national war memory was in full
swing. As Vascik and Sadler aptly stated, “[h]is statement
solidified the bounds of debate. One either believed
Germany’s hero that the army was stabbed in the back or one
didn’t. Opinions might differ as to the means, timing, and
extent of the betrayal, but the nationalist position was now
set in concrete.” 78 Hindenburg was a supplement for the
national hero Germany lacked in the Kaiser, and his support
of the Dolchstoßlegende gave it credibility. Representations
of the testimony appeared everywhere. A political, antiSemitic interpretation of the testimony was drawn by
cartoonist Werner Hahmann and published in
Kladderadatsch on November 30, 1919. 79 In this rendering
of the testimony, an elegant, trustworthy Hindenburg pulls
back a curtain to reveal a once shielded ‘truth’ of the war.
Behind the curtain, the rifle of a German infantryman has
slipped from his grasp as a petite, sneaky woman bearing
characteristic derogatory Jewish features, the Social
Democratic hat, and the serpent hair of Medusa has impaled
him from behind. Notably, the narrative was made more
potent by its vagueness. Theoretically, one could place any
member of any social class or group in the role of traitor or
stabber. In Hahmann’s rendition, he promotes anti-Semitic
and anti-feminist messages that criticize the republic’s
inclusive reforms and ideals.
The extremist right contributed greatly to
conservative nationalist renditions of Germany’s lost war. In

Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler ruminates on his war experience
and adds to the potency of the Stab-in-the-Back Myth. He
blames Marxism for the 1918 Revolution and the collapse of
the army, and equates communists with Hebrew
corrupters. 80 Hitler claims that if “twelve or fifteen thousand
of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held
under poison gas…the sacrifice of millions at the front
would not have been in vain. On the contrary: twelve
thousand scoundrels eliminated in time might have saved the
lives of a million real Germans.” 81 Hitler blamed the
revolution for Germany’s failure, and placed the revolution
solely at the hands of communists and Jews, aligning his
argument with traditional anti-Semitic critiques. His
misguided interpretation implies that real Germans had no
hand in the revolution that was distinctly German. Hitler’s
anti-Semitic interpretation of the Stab-in-the-Back Myth
was a popular rendition in the nationalist camp. The republic
and its supporters were faced with the impossible and
daunting task of refuting this narrative.
The right’s conception of Germany’s betrayal did
not go unchallenged. Although the left could not produce
any long-lasting and popular counterargument to the right’s
proposed narrative, many individuals did contest it. The
Hamburg Chapter of the Central Association of German
Citizens of the Jewish Faith disseminated a flyer in April of
1932 addressed directly to German men and women to
combat anti-Semitism within Germany. The text logically
and methodically refutes extremist ideas about race and
religion as well as misconceptions about Judaism and
Marxism. 82 More specifically, the flyer challenges the claim
that Jews shirked their war duties and betrayed the nation by
stabbing it in the back. It begs the reader to “[c]onsider that
a hundred thousand Jewish men stood next to their comrades
on the front in the Great War. Among them twelve thousand
died for the fatherland. Our slanderers and hatemongers have
gone so far as to desecrate the dead.” 83 The flyer brings
attention to the monumental number of German Jews who
fought for and were loyal to Germany in its time of war.
Although reactions to the flyer cannot be known, its
existence presented an important counterargument to the
agenda of the conservatives and the extremist rights.
Pro-republican narratives about the collective
German memory of the First World War were nuanced and
relied upon multiple ideals and mediums to counter the
right’s narrative. One such ideal was the association of the
end of the war with the German people’s liberation. This
version of the war narrative necessitated an omission of the
reality of German defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, and
subsequently glossed over any significant details about the
horrors of World War I. 84 This technique is seen in a poem
that the Majority Social Democratic Party published in
Vorwärts, a newspaper the party edited:
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… There were hardly enough coffins to take all the
dead,
earth had become one mass grave,
love had died away, reconciliation suffered from a
lingering disease,
hatred was the only master, and this eerie dance of
death was
insanely directed by a scepter.
…
Then suddenly…
Thrones were deposed. And the people, liberated
and without shackles,
Were quick to raise love and peace to the
throne …
You finished the battle, the need, serfdom and
misery …
We will always pronounce you as the year of
freedom,
Of your horrors, we will no longer speak … 85
Titled Farewell to 1918, this poem acknowledges the
destruction the war caused, and defines the conflict as the
catalyst to revolution and freedom, rather than a significant
defeat. Additionally, the poem identifies Germany’s 1918
revolution as a historical phenomenon rather than an action
which defines it as an elusive happening that was separate
from but beneficial to the people. 86 In this sense, the author
clouds the association of soldier and revolutionary, and the
people are transformed into a passive object, essentially
disassociated from the acts of revolution that they invoked.
Farewell to 1918 illuminates one limitation of the prorepublican war narrative: its omission of controversial
realities to heighten a portrayal of German revolutionary
victory which ultimately weakened its effectiveness.
Another technique that pro-republican narratives
adopted was to portray soldiers as victims of both an
international violence and an internal German corruption
that festered within the upper echelon of the German military
and Imperial state. The Great War was described in terms of
genocide, and many referred to it explicitly by this
definition, and used the word ‘Völkermord,’ which
simultaneously defined it as a slaughter and placed blame on
its participants. Republican narratives that portrayed
frontline soldiers, however, excluded the reality that
common German men who had volunteered or been
conscripted were also perpetrators of violence. 87 A poster
titled “No More War” advertises a commemoration
ceremony on July 31, 1922 for those killed in combat and
depicts a battlefield filled with mutilated and dying soldiers
who lay beneath a sky illuminated by the presence of three,
large united figures. 88 In the illustration, war becomes the
third quasi-character in its own right, but, only its aftermath
is depicted. The poster presents war as something that

happened to the passive dying soldiers, rather than
something that they themselves participated in or waged.
The attempt to separate soldiers from the
perpetration of violence in World War I and instead
emphasize their suffering muddled the pro-republican
narrative and limited its opportunity for success. The
separation of soldiers from violence conflicted with the
militaristic nature of the Reichsbanner, one of the Weimar
Republic’s primary defenders. The Reichsbanner was a
group of war veterans founded in Magdeburg in 1924 that
burgeoned into one of the republic’s largest mass
organizations, and was made up of more than three million
members. 89 In a photograph from October 1924,
Reichsbanner members march at a rally in Potsdam in a
unified formation holding German flags and wearing
military uniforms. 90 Their militaristic formation and
uniforms clash with pro-republican attempts to counter the
rightist narrative of the war by portraying soldiers as victims
and omitting violence from their identities. Ultimately, this
destabilized the pro-republican narrative. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, for a narrative to encompass both
the aims of a paramilitary group and a pro-republican
rendering of Germany’s participation in the First World War
that denied violence. This emphasizes one of the
characteristic elements of pro-republican war remembrance
that Ziemann identified: “the lack of any stable and coherent
framework or core institutional platform on which moderate
socialists and radical democrats could rely for these
purposes.” 91
Although republican supporters did propose an
alternative narrative about the war’s collective memory, it
was riddled with contradictions that ultimately weakened its
strength against the right’s narrative. In Contested
Commemorations, Ziemann explores the pro-republican
recollections of the Great War and how they supported the
Weimar Republic. 92 The largest coalition of war veterans
was mobilized by the Social Democrats to establish the
Reichsbund of War Disabled, War Veterans and War
Dependants in 1917 and the Reichsbanner Black–Red–Gold,
a League of Republican Ex-Servicemen formed in 1924, that
included members of the Center Party and DDP as well. 93
Although the members of the Reichsbanner offered an
immersive remembrance of the First World War as a defense
against right-wing myths, their primary focus on the past
ensured that they “tended to neglect or perhaps even to
obfuscate Weimar’s present future, a temporal marker that
was of paramount importance as a motivation for republican
activism.” 94 Thus, the Reichsbanner was faced with a
paradoxical challenge to honor and protect Weimar’s past
and simultaneously use this narrative to advance Weimar’s
future. Unfortunately for republican supporters, the right
was better equipped to successfully meet this challenge
because it presented a mythology that denied Germany’s

85 ‘Abschied von 1918’, Vorwärts no. 1, 1 January 1919,
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87 Ibid, 41.
88 See Figure 3.
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defeat, which was easier for Germans to accept than the
reality of the lost war.
The right was more skilled at aligning past myth
with present desires, and this is what ultimately made its
narrative more popular. Germany had to face the daunting
task of transitioning from a society at war to one at peace.
One unforeseen implication of the strain that participation in
a total war for four years created was a desire for a return to
a fictive better time, as Bessel has asserted. This return to
Imperial Germany’s golden days, and a need for normalcy
was, in the eyes of many, a simultaneous reconstitution of
“conventional, patriarchal social and family relationships
and [the] re-imposing [of] conservative moral codes.” 95
Bessel aptly asserted that the social and economic upheavals
catalyzed by war and revolution threatened the mass
masculinity of German men, and necessitated a reassertion
of order and control, particularly in regards to the behavior
of women. 96 Conservatives and the extremist right reacted to
this desire by incorporating it into their version of
Germany’s war narrative, and ensuring that it was included
in their conception of a reformed Germany. This desire to
reassert authority was the core of the right’s narrative against
the republic, and it was used to emphasize that the Weimar
Republic and its supporters could not fulfill this desire. After
the political bounds of the war debate were established, it
extended to the realms of literature and culture, ensuring that
the war’s memory was prevalent in every aspect of society.

4.

THE INTERSECTION OF THE MEMORY
OF WAR AND THE ARTS
The debate on memory entered the realm of
literature to further fragment any attempt to establish a
collective meaning within Weimar. Widespread support for
works that romanticized war and works that critiqued it were
common. One notable liberal critique of the right’s narrative
dealt with the romanticization and normalization of war and
violence. Traditional romantic views of the military were
upheld and propagated throughout Germany to ensure that
the German army was known to be prestigious and
honorable, but the loss of the war and the inhumanity of
modern warfare damaged this image. Some attempted to
uphold traditional views through literature. In 1922, Ernst
Jünger, a German soldier and author, published “Fire” to
promote a glorified version of combat. Jünger illustrates the
ideal German soldier and man, and defines them
men forged of steel, whose eagle eyes peer straight
over the propeller’s whir, studying the clouds
ahead, who…dare the hellish journey through the
roar of shell-pitted fields, who, for days on end,
approaching a certain death, crouch in encircled
nests heaped with corpses, only half alive beneath
glowing machine guns. They are the best of the
modern battlefield, suffused with the reckless
spirit of the warrior, whose iron will discharges in
clenched, well-aimed bursts of energy. 97
Bessel, Germany after the First World War, 223.
Ibid, 239.
97 Ernst Jünger, “Fire” 1922, in The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, 19.
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Jünger’s description emphasizes an idealized masculinity
that stems from the possession of a warrior’s spirit and
hinges on the notion of control. The ideal soldier is a man
who can live unperturbed amongst corpses and gunfire, and
although he is only “half alive,” he still manages to retain a
certain semblance of control that allows him to rid himself
of all emotion. The ideal man and soldier is forged by, and
is an imitation of, war itself. Jünger’s aggressive conception
of masculinity was no doubt an aggravated response to the
massive mental and physical destruction the war had on
Germany’s men. The very idea of masculinity had been
decimated, and the right sought to reinstate it.
Erich Maria Remarque, a German veteran of the
First World War, condemned normative conceptions of
violence in his publication of All Quiet on the Western Front
in 1929, eleven years after the end of the war. Remarque’s
masterpiece presented the war from the perspective of those
from below, a view that challenged the memoirs of generals
and those who peppered the upper ranks of the military. 98
All Quiet on the Western Front tells the story of a group of
twenty young German schoolboys who, encouraged by their
teachers, volunteered for the war, and one by one are killed
until only half of them remain standing in 1918. The
narrator, Paul Bäumer plays the simultaneous roles of insider
and outsider as he experiences the war and then attempts to
make sense of it through the narration. He analyzes his and
his comrades’ experiences through simple, often biting
critiques of the effects of the war and German excitement
about it. Near the end of the story, Paul’s company
commander, Bertnick, is killed and followed by another
soldier, Leer, who quickly bleeds to death from a shrapnel
wound. Paul remarks, “What use is it to him now that he was
so good at mathematics at school?” 99 Paul and his
schoolmates have been consumed by the war to the point that
they no longer exist in any other capacity.
A major theme of All Quiet on the Western Front
is betrayal. Paul reflects on how he and his schoolmates were
persuaded by their parents and former school teacher,
Kantorek, to enlist in the war. Kantorek marched Paul’s
entire class to the recruiting office to enlist, and Paul
remembers “his eyes shining at us through his spectacles and
his voice trembling with emotion as he asked, ‘You’ll all go,
won’t you lads?’” 100 Paul remarks that one of his
schoolmates, Josef Behm, was reluctant to enlist, but “it
wasn’t easy to stay out of it because at that time even our
parents used the word ‘coward’ at the drop of a hat.” 101
Behm eventually did enlist under Kantorek’s instruction,
and was one of the first from Paul’s class to be killed. Paul
links this consequence with Kantorek’s insistence that his
students join the military, and here, Remarque establishes
the feeling of betrayal of one generation by another.
The militaristic nature of Wilhelmine society is the
true enemy of Paul and his school friends, not the French,
British, or American troops they fight. Remarque makes the
point that nationalistic Imperial Germany and its proponents
led thousands of young men to a slaughter. Paul laments:
98 Norman Stone, All Quiet on the Western Front
Introduction, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018, vii.
99 Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, 240-241.
100 Ibid, 13.
101 Ibid, 14.
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While they went on writing and making speeches,
we saw field hospitals and men dying: while they
preached the service of the state as the greatest
thing, we already knew that the fear of death is
even greater. This didn’t make us into rebels or
deserters, or turn us into cowards – and they were
more than ready to use all of those words –
because we loved our country just as much as they
did, and we went bravely into every attack. But
now we were able to distinguish things clearly, all
at once our eyes had been opened. And we saw
that there was nothing left of their world. Suddenly
we found ourselves horribly alone – and we had to
come to terms with it alone as well. 102
Paul and his comrades experienced a moral bankruptcy and
disillusionment at the hands of their parents and school
teachers, the very people whose job it was to guide them.
This sense of betrayal carries significant political weight,
although Remarque makes no allusion to the
Dolchstoßlegende. In “Erich Maria Remarque and the
Weimar Anti-War Novels,” Brian Murdoch places All Quiet
on the Western Front into the antiwar novel genre, and notes
that it was common for such texts to omit the presence of the
enemy and emphasize that there must be no more war. 103 In
All Quiet on the Western Front, the absence of any
significant representation of the enemy serves to further
emphasize the culpability of the Wilhelmine ruling class in
World War I’s slaughter. This, combined with the
experience that Paul and his comrades undergo, which is
consistently marked as meaningless, provides a distinctly
political message. While Remarque claims to neither confess
nor accuse through his novel, its depiction of war defines it
as pacifist and situates it within the liberal antiwar narrative
of the Weimar political debate.
Remarque provides an alternative view of the
soldier that challenges the one Jünger presents in “Fire” and
his book Storm of Steel. Remarque’s Paul writes about the
horrors of the frontline,
and so we stumble onwards, while into our bulletridden, shot-through souls the image of the brown
earth insinuates itself painfully, the brown earth
with the greasy sun and the dead or twitching
soldiers, who lie there as if that were perfectly
normal, and who grab at our legs and scream as we
try to jump over them. We have lost all feelings
for others, we barely recognize each other when
somebody else comes into our line of vision,
agitated as we are. We are dead men with no
feelings, who are able by some trick, some
dangerous magic, to keep on running and keep on
killing. 104
Paul’s description asserts that the war has caused more than
just physical damage; he and his comrades possess bulletridden, shot-through souls that have been decimated by their

experiences. Remarque introduces an unseen dimension to
Jünger’s heralding of a soldier’s ability to live dangerously
and persevere through tough times. Through Paul, Remarque
asserts that it is not with the aid of any mystical iron
masculinity or will that men continued to fight, but rather
because they too, like the bodies they tread mindlessly over,
are dead. Remarque’s critique of the violence of war is a
refutation of the rightist narrative that promoted violence as
a necessary tenet of masculinity. Like the pro-republican
conception of soldiers, Paul and his friends are portrayed as
victims. The war had removed their humanity.
Remarque’s novel was both admired and
criticized. He prefaces the book, “This book is intended
neither as an accusation nor as a confession, but simply as
an attempt to give an account of a generation that was
destroyed by the war – even those of it who survived the
shelling.” 105 Remarque does not attempt to express the literal
truth of the war and the events and experiences of its
participants, but rather the truth of the feeling of what would
be defined by Gertrude Stein as the Lost Generation. What
made the book controversial within Weimar’s political
realm, however, was the interpretation by many that it did
attempt to assert some truth. Carl Zuckmayer, a pacifist
playwright and author, reviewed the novel in the Berliner
Illustrirte Zeitung in January 1929, and praised it, writing
that for the first time, someone has expressed “what went on
in these people, what happened inside, in the mines and sap
of the soul, in the blood, in the tissue; and that is why it is
the first war book that offers truth.” 106 Conservatives, on the
other hand, criticized the novel for its ‘misrepresentation’ of
the German army and military command.
While the novel instigated political controversy,
the release of the film catalyzed a crisis. The announcement
in August 1929 that the production of a film adaptation of
All Quiet by Universal Pictures Corporation was in the
works was ill-received by the political right. In “War,
Memory, and Politics: The Fate of the Film All Quiet on the
Western Front” historian Modris Eksteins describes the
history of the film’s presentation in Germany and the
backlash that ensued, arguing that with the film’s release in
December, “many of the frustrations and fears, and much
hatred and resentment, prevalent in various sectors of
German politics and the economy, would converge
dramatically on All Quiet.” 107 On the evening of December
5, 1930 at a 7pm showing of the film, riots and protests
organized by the Nazis broke out in the theatre. After scenes
of a German retreat were seen, cries from Nazis and their
supporters broke out, “‘German soldiers had courage. It’s a
disgrace that such an insulting film was made in America!’
And: ‘Down with the hunger government which permits
such a film!’” 108 The film was stopped, and soon stink
bombs, sneeze powder, and white mice were released by
Nazis throughout the theatre, accompanied by fights and the
Nazi assessment that they were in the presence of a Jewish
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audience. 109 The outrage stemmed from a claim that the film
injured Germany’s image, and was part of a ‘propaganda
war’ being waged against Germany by the United States.
Consequently, the film was banned on December 11th
because of the harms it posed to Germany’s image. 110
Consequently, the Nazi party claimed a victory in
the “film war” that had been waged over All Quiet, while
outrage emanated from the liberal and socialist left. The left
criticized the government for betraying its own republican
ideals and capitulating to the threat of a mob. But while the
liberal population of Berlin was outspoken about the result
of the “film war,” other provinces of the country supported
the government’s decision. 111 Ultimately, no matter how
truthful All Quiet’s portrayal of Germany’s experience in the
war was, its threat to political stability was greater. The
consequence of banning the film was that the government
subtly justified the Nazi narrative of the war. In agreeing that
the film was harmful to Germany’s international image and
did not truthfully portray the German war experience, the
Weimar Republic legitimized nationalist conceptions of the
memory of World War I. And so, the Nazi Party walked
away with a small but significant “victory” in its pocket and
inched closer to its seizure of power in 1933.
Ernst Friedrich, a writer and outspoken critic of
war, contributed to the war debate when he published a
photographic narrative of the Great War in protest of the
violent ideals the promotion of war instituted within society.
In 1924, Friedrich’s War Against War! was published as part
of a larger antimilitarist campaign as German citizens gained
knowledge of Germany’s organization of the Black
Reichswehr to secretly rearm itself. 112 As professor and
historian Dora Apel asserted, at the time of War Against
War’s publication, “the organized pacifist movement was
politically contained by the ruling Social Democrats and
effectively moribund; war imagery shifted dramatically
away from antiwar statements in graphic art and paintings
toward heroic imagery in hugely popular patriotic
photography albums.” 113 Friedrich’s work was an ambitious
attempt to shift the popular support for heroism and re-center
the narrative on the inhumane consequences of the First
World War. The images he chose to include emphasize the
gruesome mutilation and destruction that war causes to men
of all nations, religions, and political affiliations.
Friedrich’s technique was to heighten the sense of
horror at the reality of modern war by presenting
photographs in pairs where one celebrated the war and the
other presented its horrid truth. He begins with a photo titled
“From the August days of 1914 — Enthusiastic . . . for what?
. . .” 114 The image shows a mix of young men, some outfitted
in military uniforms and others in civilian suits, all marching

through the streets of Germany, waving and smiling, holding
bouquets and rifles adorned with flowers. 115 Uncaptioned,
one could mistake the image for one depicting a victorious
army returning from war. Friedrich’s caption critiques the
celebration of the ensuing war that took hold of Germans
through the “Spirit of 1914.” Its pair finishes the caption
with the phrase, “. . .for the ‘field of honor.’” 116 The second
photograph shows an indecipherable number of bodies at the
front collected in a mass. 117 None of the men are identifiable,
their faces covered or too disfigured to tell. The anonymity
of the second photo heightens its pacifist power, the soldiers
could be of any army, nation, or political party. Friedrich’s
pairing of the photos emphasizes the inhumanity of the
conflict and attempts to contribute to the shaping of
Weimar’s collective public memory over the war. Apel
argues that Friedrich’s photographic narrative could not
generate an alternative collective memory that was strong
enough to oppose the rise of National Socialism. 118 This,
however, was not the point of Friedrich’s work, and no one
could anticipate the success that the militaristic political
right’s narrative would have.
The war debate reached the artistic realm as well.
Jay Winter’s Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning explores
the depth of individual and mass bereavement inflicted by
the First World War. Käthe Kollwitz was a prominent Berlin
artist when the Great War broke out in 1914 and was known
as a printmaker and a visual poet. Her son, Peter, volunteered
for the war when he was eighteen-years-old, and was killed
on October 30, 1914 in Flanders. 119 Over the next seventeen
years, Kollwitz would dedicate her artwork to Peter in an
effort to memorialize him and the thousands of other
children lost to the war. Kollwitz finished her project in
April 1931, and it was placed in the Belgium cemetery were
Peter is buried, adjacent to his grave. 120 Her memorial, titled
Die Eltern, or The Parents, is the sculpture of two figures in
granite, both on their knees. 121 Die Eltern makes tangible a
palpable sense of guilt. Kollwitz and her husband are on their
knees to beg for Peter’s forgiveness, “to ask him to accept
their failure to find a better way, their failure to prevent the
madness of war from cutting his life short.” 122 Kollwitz’s
sculpture expresses this guilt masterfully, and this sentiment
of remorse adds another, more political dimension to her
work. Kollwitz’s grief and guilt was heightened because of
her original support for the war and encouragement of Peter
to participate. This adds a collective meaning to her work
that encompasses a larger memory landscape by
acknowledging the role of a nation state in bereavement. 123
Kollwitz attempts to atone for her actions as a mother, and
address how her decision fit into the larger narrative of a
generation. Die Eltern connects to the antiwar narrative and
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sense of betrayal that was presented by pro-republicans and
Erich Maria Remarque in All Quiet on the Western Front.
Kollwitz’s creation was born of her grief, and through this,
she atones not only for her and her husband, but the folly of
an entire generation that sent their sons to a slaughter.
The element of betrayal and corruption was also
addressed in political cartoons. In early April of 1919,
George Grosz’s sketch of a military doctor and a soldier was
published. Grosz was a German artist known for his
caricature drawings, and was a member of the Berlin Dada
and New Objectivity group. 124 At the close of the war,
Grosz’s work was dominated by satire and themes that
addressed Weimar’s post-war mood. Grosz’s art addressed
the betrayal of the revolution, the corruption of those in
power, and the brutality of militarism. 125 His sketch,
Military doctor pronouncing a skeleton “K.V.” or active for
duty, provides a biting critique on the role Imperial Germany
and its supporters played in the slaughter of World War I. In
his sketch, a robust German doctor embraces a rotting corpse
while surrounded by military personnel who take notes and
comment on the process. 126 Grosz’s sketch is simultaneous
critique of what the German army had become by 1918, and
the role of medical professionals and military officials in its
corruption. Grosz’s message is clear: German soldiers were
dead men walking, even before they reached the front.

CONCLUSION
The memory of Germany’s experience in the First
World War was fragmented from the moment war was
declared in the summer of 1914. This fragmentation,
combined with the loss of the war in 1918, resulted in a lack
of public consensus on the war’s meaning. This aggravated
Weimar’s political world, and consequently, the war’s
memory was used as a tool by the conservatives and the
extremist right to wage war against the Weimar Republic.
The Treaty of Versailles, the diverse Stab-in-the-Back Myth,
and propaganda against Jews, socialists, republicans, and
women were used to delegitimize the republic. The left’s
response, as seen in Ernst Friedrich’s photographic
narrative, public denouncement of anti-Semitism, and
attempts by the Reichsbanner to impart a pro-republican
narrative, was inadequate to halt the right’s consolidation of
power in 1933. Political debate seeped into the realm of
literature as well, and the novel and film, All Quiet on the
Western Front, presents an example of the significance of
the war’s contestation eleven years after its end in 1918. A
collective lack of consensus on the war’s meaning was used
by the right to both dismantle the Weimar republic from
within, and to instill an authoritarian regime.
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